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Curaleaf vs. Aurora: paying for access, not greenhouses

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A hostile bid, two sets of numbers and the question of what Aurora is worth. The fight is in Canada, the prize is Europe.

By Falk Altenhöfer, Cannabis-Startups.com, 3 September 2026

 

The short version

  • Curaleaf is offering 0.3463 of its own shares plus US$0.75 in cash per Aurora share, roughly US$4.00 in total, capped at US$5.00. The offer runs until 1 December 2026.
  • Aurora’s board unanimously recommends rejection: too little premium, a debt-free balance sheet with C$149 million in cash, and a transfer of risk onto its own shareholders.
  • Curaleaf counters: US$398 million of dilution since 2020, Aurora’s own share sales at US$3.09, and an outlook that calls for lower revenue and lower EBITDA in 2027.
  • What is being bought is access: EU-GMP product in volume and shelf space in Germany, Poland and Australia. Building that would take years.
  • Depending on the lens, Aurora is worth between four and twelve times EBITDA. US$4 is probably not the last word.

For a good three weeks, two of the biggest names in our industry have been trading blows in public, and since yesterday it has turned openly hostile. Curaleaf, by its own account the highest-revenue cannabis company in the United States, wants to buy Aurora Cannabis, the Canadian producer that, through Aurora Deutschland (formerly Pedanios), has been one of the most important suppliers to German pharmacies for around a decade. Aurora’s board unanimously recommends that shareholders reject the offer. Curaleaf responds point by point. And this morning Juan Pablo Martínez Pavón, CEO of Curaleaf International, published an open letter addressed directly to Aurora’s employees.

I wrote in August what I think this deal is really about: market share and certified EU-GMP capacity, not cultivation space. Nothing about that has changed. What has changed is the tone, and there are now enough numbers on the table for anyone to form their own view. That is what I am trying to do here: explain what matters for us in Europe, run the deal through a buy-or-build lens, and finally answer the question I have been asked most often in the past few days. What is Aurora actually worth?

What has happened so far

A short chronology, because it shows how quickly this escalated:

The offer in numbers

Curaleaf is offering 0.3463 of its own shares plus US$0.75 in cash for each Aurora share. At Curaleaf’s closing price of US$9.39 on 10 August, that works out to roughly US$4.00 per share, or about US$260 million for the whole company on the shares outstanding, and around US$272 million on a fully diluted basis. Against the 30-day average of US$2.75, that is a 45 percent premium. Strip out Aurora’s cash and Curaleaf calls it 110 percent. The value is capped at US$5.00: if Curaleaf’s 20-day average price rises above C$17.05 (roughly US$12.30), Aurora shareholders receive correspondingly fewer Curaleaf shares. There are no financing or due diligence conditions. What the offer does require is acceptance: more than 50 percent of the shares held by independent shareholders, a statutory threshold Curaleaf cannot waive, plus its own condition of at least two-thirds of all shares on a fully diluted basis, which it can waive. On top of that come regulatory approvals, no material adverse change, and Aurora’s shareholder rights plan not getting in the way. The deadline is 1 December at 5 p.m. Mountain Time.

Two things matter here. First, this is essentially a share swap. By Aurora’s own calculation, its shareholders would own about 7.7 percent of the combined company but, because of Curaleaf’s multiple voting shares, only about 3.2 percent of the votes. Second, the market has re-rated Curaleaf’s own shares since the US rescheduling of medical cannabis on 23 April 2026, though by less than an unadjusted twelve-month chart suggests. On 5 June, Curaleaf carried out a 1-for-3 reverse stock split to prepare for a US listing, which triples every pre-June price on any chart not adjusted for it. On a split-adjusted basis the stock trades roughly 80 percent above its 52-week low and well below its 2026 high. Aurora, by Curaleaf’s count, lost about 35 percent over the year to 10 August. So Curaleaf is paying with paper the market has marked up, for a company whose share price was on the floor. That is not an accusation, it is textbook. It is worth noting all the same, because Aurora’s 1-for-10 consolidation of 2024 gets held against it in this debate: both houses have reached for the same instrument, Aurora two years ago, Curaleaf three months before the bid.

The market itself is keeping its cards close. Aurora closed at US$4.04 on Nasdaq on 1 September, almost exactly the current value of the offer (at a Curaleaf price of US$9.70 it is worth about US$4.10). As recently as 18 December 2025, Aurora traded above US$5, which means the cap on this offer sits below a price the stock had nine months ago.

Aurora’s defence

The directors’ circular of 2 September is blunt. The core message: the offer is inadequate, it values Aurora at a discount to comparable cannabis companies, and it contains no real control premium. A fairness opinion from the financial adviser dated 1 September is attached. TD Securities had already written in August that the bid does not adequately reflect Aurora’s position in the medical market, its balance sheet or its international growth potential.

Miguel Martin, Executive Chairman and CEO, puts it more sharply in Aurora’s own statement: the bid is inadequate and harmful to shareholders, and Curaleaf, carrying more than a billion dollars of debt, is asking Aurora’s owners to give up a stronger, debt-free and growing global medical cannabis company for an offer with, in his words, “intentionally limited upside”, one that does not reflect Aurora’s fundamental value, exposes them to Curaleaf’s risks and would leave them with little voting influence in the combined company. Aurora is pushing that message hard, including on its own LinkedIn channel, and points shareholders to its campaign site protectaurora.com.

The second argument is cash. Aurora is debt-free and, as of 30 June, held C$149 million in cash, restricted cash and short-term investments. The billion dollars Martin refers to is Aurora’s count of Curaleaf’s borrowings plus lease obligations. Aurora puts it this way: Curaleaf wants to use Aurora shareholders’ own money to repair its balance sheet and pick up Aurora’s assets at a discount.

Third, risk transfer. Those who swap get Curaleaf shares with everything that comes attached: price swings, high-cost debt, tax uncertainties from the US past under Section 280E, a multi-class share structure, and a listing on the TSX and in OTC trading rather than on a US exchange.

And fourth, the future. Aurora says it has spent years building a global medical cannabis network, one of the largest indoor EU-GMP networks in the world, and that the harvest of that transformation is still to come. The board is also reviewing alternatives. That is the standard formula for saying you are talking to other interested parties, or at least acting as if you were.

Curaleaf’s counter-arithmetic

Curaleaf’s same-day reply is required reading for anyone who wants to know how a hostile bidder argues. For a more compact version, IgniteIt has summarised the rebuttal in detail. The points in brief:

The premium, Curaleaf says, sits in the 63rd percentile of all Canadian takeover premiums of the past ten years, and the US$5 cap (an 82 percent premium to the unaffected price) in the 92nd. On estimated calendar 2026 adjusted EBITDA, the offer works out to 12.0 times, more than two-thirds above what comparable Canadian producers trade at.

Aurora’s debt-free balance sheet, Curaleaf argues, was bought dearly. Since September 2020, Aurora has raised around US$398 million through share issuances, roughly 31 percent dilution. Through its at-the-market programme, the board sold shares in the last two quarters alone at average prices of US$3.57 and US$3.09, well below the price it now calls inadequate. This is the point Aurora has yet to answer convincingly.

The business, Curaleaf says, is burning cash. Operating cash flow in the June quarter was negative (minus C$4.4 million), and Aurora’s own outlook for fiscal 2027 calls for revenue roughly at fiscal 2025 levels and lower adjusted EBITDA than in fiscal 2026. Curaleaf, by its own account, generated US$157 million of operating cash flow over the last twelve months, US$50 million of it in the first half of 2026.

And the transformation. Since Miguel Martin took over in September 2020, Curaleaf says, Aurora has booked transformation costs in seven consecutive years, more than C$400 million in write-downs and restructuring costs in total, plus more than C$480 million of cumulative negative operating cash flow. Curaleaf’s line, paraphrased: a six-year programme is no longer a transformation, it is the business model. That Curaleaf insiders own about 20 percent of their own company while Aurora’s leadership owns about one percent, and that Martin runs the Canadian company from his home in the United States, belongs to the more personal part of the rebuttal.

Curaleaf chairman and CEO Boris Jordan calls Aurora’s refusal to talk about price disappointing and a disregard for its own shareholders. The two sides do not even agree on whether talks happened: Curaleaf says it has had no substantive conversation, and that Aurora would not sign an NDA or allow a site visit while claiming to be open to discussions; Aurora says its lead independent director was in contact with Jordan up to 24 July. When a bidder puts a number in public, that dispute is usually the reason. Curaleaf also names what it expects to earn from a merger: at least US$40 million a year in cost synergies from overhead, procurement, supply chain and international infrastructure, roughly three-quarters of Aurora’s record EBITDA.

Six years of Martin: the losses, soberly

In the LinkedIn comment sections, criticism of Aurora’s leadership usually boils down to one number: three billion of losses since Miguel Martin took office in September 2020. The number is roughly right, but it explains little. So here are the net results year by year, as Aurora reported them (in Canadian dollars):

  • Fiscal 2021 (to June 2021, with Martin in charge from September 2020): minus C$693 million from continuing operations, of which C$427 million were impairments. Adjusted EBITDA minus C$114 million.
  • Fiscal 2022 (to June 2022): minus C$1.72 billion, mostly non-cash write-downs of goodwill, intangibles and plant. C$505 million in the June quarter alone.
  • Fiscal 2023 (shortened to nine months, to March 2023): minus C$206 million. First positive adjusted EBITDA in the December 2022 quarter.
  • Fiscal 2024 (to March 2024): roughly minus C$70 million. First year of positive adjusted EBITDA (C$12.8 million), convertible notes fully repaid, 1-for-10 share consolidation to keep the Nasdaq listing.
  • Fiscal 2025 (to March 2025): plus C$1.6 million. The target of positive free cash flow was hit in the December 2024 quarter.
  • Fiscal 2026 (to March 2026): minus C$136 million including discontinued operations, of which C$77 million from the discontinued businesses, mainly the Bevo exit. Record adjusted EBITDA of C$53.8 million.

Roughly C$2.8 billion in total. The accumulated deficit rose from C$3.7 billion to C$6.5 billion over the same period. The context missing from the comments: around two billion of that is write-downs of goodwill, intangibles and plant, and most of it traces back to the acquisitions and expansion plans of the years before Martin, above all MedReleaf (bought in 2018 for around C$3.2 billion in stock) and CanniMed. That was value destruction, but it was created under Terry Booth and admitted on the balance sheet under Martin. What weighs on Martin’s own record are the operating numbers Curaleaf cites: more than C$480 million of cumulative negative operating cash flow, more than C$400 million of inventory write-downs and restructuring costs, US$398 million of fresh equity at around 31 percent dilution, plus the detours via Reliva (the US CBD company Martin came from, bought in May 2020 for around US$40 million in Aurora stock and no longer part of the portfolio today), Bevo (plant propagation, bought in 2022, exited in 2026) and Thrive (bought in 2022 to expand the Canadian consumer business, which is now being wound down). Cash has shrunk from C$441 million in June 2021 to C$149 million. In return, the convertible notes are gone, and the result of the clean-up is real: from minus C$114 million of adjusted EBITDA in year one to plus C$53.8 million in year six, in a medical business that now generates C$289 million in revenue, more than half of it outside Canada.

Shareholders have not applauded throughout. At the previous annual meeting, executive pay received only about 39 percent support in the advisory vote, after which the board cut the CEO’s long-term incentive target from 375 to 325 percent of base salary.

So does Martin name a strategic goal? Looking back, yes, and he hit most of them: C$150 to 170 million in annualised cost savings by the end of 2022, positive adjusted EBITDA by the first half of fiscal 2023, positive free cash flow by the end of calendar 2024, and most recently a revenue forecast for the global medical business that was beaten; along the way the cannabis business became debt-free. For the period after 2026 there is nothing of the kind. The official goal in the latest quarterly report reads: new records in revenue and adjusted EBITDA “in the long term”, sustained double-digit growth “over time”, an addressable global market of around nine billion dollars. No number, no date, no milestone. The directors’ circular speaks of significant value creation still ahead and of alternatives being evaluated. That is a direction, not a target. And that is exactly the gap Curaleaf’s question is aimed at: if management’s plan is worth more than the offer, where is the evidence?

The letter to the workforce

This morning, Juan Pablo Martínez Pavón, CEO of Curaleaf International, published a letter on LinkedIn addressed “to everyone at Aurora”. It is worth reading in full. The gist: he is Mexican, grew up in the UK and runs the international business out of London, not from a distant head office. He did not come to cannabis through business but through a family member who came off strong opioids with a cannabis tincture. When he took the role, Curaleaf International was doing less than US$15 million a quarter; last quarter it did more than US$50 million, up 26 percent year on year, with 836 people across Canada, Germany, the UK, Poland, Spain, Portugal and Australia.

The real point of the letter is the integration record: eight acquisitions in six years, and the founders still run their businesses, the UK clinic, the British specials manufacturer, the Polish clinic. At Four 20 Pharma in Germany, the founder recently moved on and the second in command stepped up; nobody was flown in from head office. Anyone in doubt should ask someone who joined Curaleaf through one of those deals. His inbox is open. And, stated explicitly: please do not send any non-public information about Aurora.

You can read it as PR, and of course it is part of the campaign. I still think it is smart, for a simple reason: takeover battles are won among shareholders, integrations are won among employees. Anyone who wants to keep Aurora Deutschland, the people in Leuna or the team in Australia after a deal has to address exactly this worry, that a US corporation will run a European business out of Stamford. Aurora’s workforce, more than a thousand people according to the letter, is the one asset that neither side’s presentation puts a value on. The full text is here on LinkedIn.

Buy or build: a schematic view

Now to the actual question. Why does Curaleaf buy Aurora instead of continuing to build its international business organically with its own cash flow? Curaleaf International is, after all, growing at 26 percent a year. The schematic answer:

Building block What Aurora brings What “build” would mean
EU-GMP supply Several EU-GMP-certified indoor sites in Canada, plus Safari Flower since April 2026 (around 5,500 m², EU-GMP certificate issued in July for three years), plus Leuna in Saxony-Anhalt with one of the three German cultivation licences Site build-out, certification, genetics, consistent quality: realistically two to four years and a double-digit million sum, with no guarantee of the same consistency
Germany Aurora Deutschland in the market since 2015 (as Pedanios), brands Aurora, Pedanios and IndiMed, two cultivars among the country’s five best-sellers according to Aurora, Germany the biggest growth driver in fiscal 2026 Four20 Pharma is growing, but shelf space, pharmacy relationships and cultivar reputation cannot be built in quarters
Other markets Leading position in the Canadian medical market, number one market share in Poland by Aurora’s own count, plus Australia and New Zealand, and since August its own importer plus pharmacy in the UK Licences, partners, pharmacovigilance and distribution, country by country
Balance sheet C$149 million in cash, no debt Own capital and time
Scale Around C$64 million of medical revenue per quarter Curaleaf International is at just over US$50 million a quarter; Aurora would roughly double the international business

Time is the real currency here. The German market has multiplied since April 2024, wholesale prices are falling, and in a market with falling prices the winner is whoever has its own certified product in volume and does not have to buy on the spot market. With Aurora, Curaleaf gets volume, genetics and shelf space in one step, pays with shares the market has marked up since rescheduling, and collects Aurora’s cash along the way. Building would take years, during which others buy. That is why the timing is not a coincidence but the core of the deal.

What is Aurora worth?

There is no single number. There are five lenses, and they are far apart.

The market: before the bid, the stock market valued Aurora at around US$180 million (US$2.75 per share on just over 65 million shares). Today it is around US$263 million. In December 2025 it was more than US$325 million. In between lie the roughly 30 percent cut to Canadian veterans’ reimbursement on 1 April, the end of statutory insurance reimbursement for flower in Germany on 30 July, and an outlook that calls for lower revenue and lower EBITDA in 2027.

The offer: around US$260 million today, at most about US$325 million if the cap kicks in, which is roughly what the market itself paid for Aurora last December.

The balance sheet: C$149 million in cash (around US$107 million) and no debt. Net of cash, Curaleaf is paying about US$150 million for the operating business. Book equity stands at C$527 million, but book values at cannabis producers have proven one thing above all in recent years, namely that they can be written down. The accumulated deficit of C$6.5 billion is the monument to that.

Earnings power: on the record fiscal 2026 (C$53.8 million adjusted EBITDA), Curaleaf is paying just under seven times including cash and about four times excluding it. On Curaleaf’s own estimate for calendar 2026, it is the 12.0 times quoted above. The gap between 4 and 12 is the whole story of this deal: if you believe fiscal 2026 is the new normal, the offer looks cheap. If you follow Aurora’s own outlook (first quarter of fiscal 2027: C$3.4 million EBITDA, negative cash flow), it looks generous. On revenue, Curaleaf is paying about 1.1 times annual sales, or about 0.65 times excluding cash, for a business with close to 60 percent gross margin and 17 percent international growth. That is no longer a bargain, but it is not a price that should make a strategic buyer nervous either.

Strategic value: this is the lens that decides it in the end. To the stock market, Aurora is a Canadian producer with a shrinking home market. To a buyer with a European distribution machine that needs product, Aurora is an EU-GMP supplier with shelf space in Germany, Poland and Australia. The second buyer always pays more than the first. That is exactly why Curaleaf can offer a 45 percent premium and still consider the price cheap.

My sober assessment: US$4 is not the last word. Either Curaleaf raises to get the last shareholders over the line (the US$5 cap leaves room for that), or a second bidder emerges. Aurora itself says it is reviewing alternatives. What the board cannot argue away, though, is its own outlook. It is hard to explain why a company should be worth much more while announcing at the same time that it will be smaller and less profitable in 2027. And it is hard to explain why US$4 is inadequate when you sold shares at US$3.09 a few months ago.

What it means for Europe

First: consolidation is no longer a theory. With the rescheduling of medical cannabis behind them and a stock that works as currency again, US companies have, for the first time in years, the means to buy big in Europe. Aurora is the biggest case so far, not the last.

Second: what is being paid for is access, not greenhouses. Aurora’s own purchase in Birmingham (an importer plus a pharmacy for £2.1 million) and Curaleaf’s Four20 Pharma tell the same story. Whoever holds an import licence, a wholesaler, a pharmacy, a clinic or a robust position on the pharmacy shelf in Europe is sitting on what is in demand right now. For European founders, that is the good news in this story: strategic buyers are back.

Third: the regulatory risks in Germany come with the purchase. Since 30 July, statutory health insurers no longer pay for flower (in German), around 65,000 patients are affected (in German), and extracts are reimbursed only after a six-month trial with an approved finished medicinal product. The MedCanG amendment (in German) with telemedicine and mail-order restrictions is still sitting in the health committee and will arrive in late autumn at the earliest. In March, the Federal Court of Justice tightened the advertising rules (in German) for cannabis treatments. Curaleaf explicitly named the insurance decision as a burden on Aurora’s German business in its own rebuttal. The price on the table already contains that risk, and the same applies to any other buyer.

Fourth: for pharmacies and patients, nothing changes for now. Both sides have an interest in keeping Aurora, Pedanios and IndiMed on the shelf, and Curaleaf’s integration model suggests Aurora Deutschland would continue as its own unit. Whether a combined supplier can enforce price discipline in wholesale remains to be seen. In a market with more than 50 importers, I would not hold my breath.

My conclusion

The offer is opportunistic, but by market standards not unfair. Aurora’s defence rests on a future that does not appear in its own outlook. Curaleaf’s pitch rests on a share price the market re-rated after rescheduling and has since marked down again from its high. Both are open to attack. Shareholders will decide by 1 December, and I expect the price to move once more before then. The arithmetic of that decision favours Aurora’s board more than the headlines suggest: without its support, getting two-thirds of the shares tendered is hard, and even the statutory majority only gets Curaleaf control, not the clean second step.

For us in Europe, the real news is a different one: the most valuable part of a cannabis company today is what sits between harvest and patient. Whoever owns that gets bought. Whoever only grows, supplies.

Correction, 3 September: An earlier version said Curaleaf’s shares had risen roughly fivefold over twelve months. That figure came from an unadjusted price chart and did not account for the 1-for-3 reverse stock split of 5 June 2026. Adjusted, the 52-week low is US$5.40 rather than US$1.80. The passage has been corrected and the note on both companies’ consolidations added. Thanks to the reader who flagged it.

This piece is a market commentary, not investment advice. All figures come from the linked publications of the two companies, from Juan Pablo Martínez Pavón’s LinkedIn letter of 3 September and from public market data. Conversions use the exchange rate assumed in Curaleaf’s offer of US$0.72 per Canadian dollar.

Sources

Company statements on the offer

  • Aurora Cannabis, directors’ circular and press release, 2 September 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-urges-shareholders-to-reject-curaleafs-hostile-bid-warning-that-it-is-inadequate-undervalues-aurora-and-puts-shareholder-value-and-future-upside-at-risk-302867207.html
  • Curaleaf, response to the directors’ circular, 2 September 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/curaleaf-responds-to-aurora-circular-reaffirms-offer-as-the-best-path-to-value-creation-for-shareholders-302867867.html
  • Curaleaf, response to Aurora’s statements, 24 August 2026: https://www.stocktitan.net/news/ACB/curaleaf-responds-to-aurora-cannabis-latest-attempt-to-deflect-from-l232ypmuw235.html
  • Aurora Cannabis, recommendation to shareholders to take no action for now, 19 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-inc-urges-shareholders-to-take-no-action-at-this-time-in-respect-to-the-unsolicited-take-over-bid-by-curaleaf-holdings-inc-302854811.html
  • Curaleaf, formal offer and take-over bid circular, 18 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/curaleaf-launches-take-over-bid-to-acquire-aurora-cannabis-invites-aurora-shareholders-to-tender-to-the-bid-302854033.html
  • Curaleaf, offer announcement, 18 August 2026: https://ir.curaleaf.com/2026-08-18-Curaleaf-Launches-Take-Over-Bid-to-Acquire-Aurora-Cannabis,-Invites-Aurora-Shareholders-to-Tender-to-the-Bid
  • Aurora Cannabis, response to Curaleaf’s announcement, 11 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-inc-responds-to-press-release-of-curaleaf-holdings-inc-regarding-intention-to-launch-unsolicited-take-over-bid-302848839.html
  • Aurora Cannabis, shareholder information site: https://www.protectaurora.com
  • Juan Pablo Martínez Pavón, “To everyone at Aurora”, open letter on LinkedIn, 3 September 2026: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/everyone-aurora-juan-pablo-mart%C3%ADnez-pav%C3%B3n-wd0je/

Aurora financials

  • Q1 fiscal 2027 results, 5 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-fiscal-2027-first-quarter-results-302843099.html
  • Q1 fiscal 2027 earnings call transcript (The Motley Fool), 12 August 2026: https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2026/08/12/aurora-cannabis-acb-q1-2027-earnings-call-transcript/
  • Acquisition of Internode Pharma and HAP Pharma, 19 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-furthers-global-medical-cannabis-growth-with-accretive-acquisition-of-internode-pharma-limited-and-hap-pharma-limited-expanding-distribution-access-to-the-uk-medical-cannabis-market-302855564.html
  • Fiscal 2026 results and fiscal 2027 outlook, 11 June 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-full-year-and-fiscal-2026-fourth-quarter-results-with-record-annual-revenue-and-adjusted-ebitda-302797627.html
  • Fiscal 2026 MD&A (net loss including discontinued operations): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001683541/000162828026042364/mda20260331q42026.htm
  • 2026 annual general meeting materials (say-on-pay, CEO compensation): https://www.stocktitan.net/sec-filings/ACB/6-k-aurora-cannabis-inc-current-report-foreign-issuer-c1efb7ab13ad.html
  • Q3 fiscal 2025 results, positive free cash flow target achieved, 5 February 2025: https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/aurora-cannabis-announces-fiscal-2025-third-quarter-results-2025-02-05
  • First domestically grown brand from Leuna, January 2025: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-launches-first-domestically-grown-medical-cannabis-brand-in-germany-under-new-cultivation-license-302357848.html
  • Fiscal 2024 results, 20 June 2024: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-files-full-year-results-and-announces-fiscal-2024-fourth-quarter-302177485.html
  • Completion of the 1-for-10 share consolidation, 20 February 2024: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-cfo-transition-and-completion-of-previously-announced-share-consolidation-302065495.html
  • Q3 fiscal 2023 MD&A (nine-month result, fiscal 2022 comparison): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1683541/000168354123000007/mda20230331q32023.htm
  • Fiscal 2022 results, 20 September 2022: https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-fiscal-2022-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-results-804265885.html
  • Fiscal 2021 results, 27 September 2021: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-fiscal-2021-fourth-quarter-results-301385769.html
  • Completion of the Reliva acquisition, 28 May 2020: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-completes-acquisition-of-reliva-llc-301067122.html

Curaleaf financials

  • Q2 2026 results, 5 August 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/curaleaf-reports-second-quarter-2026-results-continued-growth-margin-strength-and-profitability-302844126.html
  • 1-for-3 reverse stock split in preparation for a US listing, 26 May 2026: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/curaleaf-announces-1-for-3-reverse-stock-split-in-preparation-for-us-stock-exchange-uplisting-302781521.html

Market data

  • Aurora Cannabis, price and market capitalisation (Investing.com): https://www.investing.com/equities/aurora-cannabis
  • Aurora Cannabis, price and market capitalisation (Robinhood): https://robinhood.com/us/en/stocks/ACB/
  • Curaleaf, price history (Macrotrends): https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/CURLF/curaleaf-holdings/stock-price-history

German regulation (sources in German)

  • KV Westfalen-Lippe on the GKV-Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz, in force since 30 July 2026: https://www.kvwl.de/aktuelles/detail/nachricht-gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-seit-30-juli-2026-in-kraft
  • Hanf Magazin on the Bundestag decision (around 65,000 patients affected): https://www.hanf-magazin.com/recht/rechtslage-deutschland/cannabis-auf-kassenrezept-bundestag-beschliesst-vorrang-fuer-fertigarzneimittel/
  • Status of the MedCanG amendment, Drucksache 21/3061: https://jiroo.de/medcang-radar/
  • Analysis of the Federal Court of Justice ruling I ZR 74/25 of 26 March 2026 (law firm Cornea Franz): https://www.cornea-franz.de/medcang-novelle-versandverbot-apotheken/

Further coverage

  • IgniteIt, “Curaleaf Escalates Aurora Takeover Fight”, 2 September 2026: https://www.igniteit.com/news/curaleaf-aurora-takeover-fight/
  • Highly Capitalized, “Aurora vs Curaleaf: M&A Clash Reaches Shareholder Decision Point”, 3 September 2026: https://highlycapitalized.com/aurora-vs-curaleaf-ma-clash-reaches-shareholder-decision-point
  • The Deep Dive on the offer conditions and deadline, August 2026: https://thedeepdive.ca/curaleaf-takes-us4-a-share-aurora-bid-straight-to-shareholders/
  • mg Magazine on the cap, the thresholds and the second-step transaction, August 2026: https://mgmagazine.com/business-strategy/finance-acquisitions-business-strategy/curaleaf-aurora-tender-offer-shareholder-risks/
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